Effects of software security on software development life cycle and related security issues by Mohaddes Deylami, Hanif et al.
                International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security,  
December 2015, Vol. 6 No. 8,  
      ISSN: 1837-7823 
4 
 
 
Effects of Software Security on Software Development Life Cycle and 
Related Security Issues 
  
Hanif Mohaddes Deylami a, b, Iman Tabatabaei Ardekani a 
Ravie Chandren Muniyandi b, Abdolhossein Sarrafzadeh a 
a Department of Computing and Information Technology, Unitec Institute of Technology, 
Private Bag 92025, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142, New Zealand. 
b
 School of Computer Science, Faculty of Information Science and Technology, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Malaysia. 
hmdeilami@gmail.com , iardekani@unitec.ac.nz 
ravie@ukm.edu.my , hsarrafzadeh@unitec.ac.nz 
 
Abstract 
Security is a significant issue in the software development life cycle, and may become 
much more problematic in the future. In the current state there is no simple solution to the 
software security issue. Moreover, software developers have to be able to deal with huge 
numbers of defects in software. Security must be integrated into the development process from 
the beginning and continue through the design process to improve the security of the released 
software. This paper discusses software security challenges that one might face when 
developing enterprise software applications. As an essential concept in software engineering, 
software security is the process of protecting data and resources in order to achieve a more 
secure and reliable design and implementation. The main contribution of the paper is to present, 
in a coherent manner, major existing approaches and to emphasize description and method 
guidelines in particular. Moreover, this paper shows how to plan and conduct software 
development projects for creating secure and reliable products. Finally, it reviews the software 
security attribute requirements.  
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Today, web applications are very popular and essential tools for organizations and 
businesses because they can create business value by interconnecting a business with their 
customers and prospects. Businesses can be jeopardized, essential customers’ information and 
data could be critically affected by hackers who seek out loopholes in web applications. 
Traditionally, security testing is performed when the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
approaches to its final phases. In this situation, security testing can be considered as a barrier 
against the completion of the project in a timely manner, because fixing found-late bugs or 
issues usually requires unexpected resources. Particularly when the bugs do not cause any 
problem for the functionality of the software but creates a flaw in its security. 
To solve this problem, secure SDLC initiatives can be adopted, where security deliverables are 
included in all SDLC phases. The positive results of the above actions are (1) Reduced security 
issues (2) Quicker defect rectification (3) Highlighting risks in first step of SDLC, and (4) 
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Reduced costs [1]. Generally hackers can penetrate systems by taking advantage of defects [2]. 
The Internet enables hackers to collect data and information through security holes in software. 
In fact there are always some security vulnerability in a piece of software. Moving towards any 
fundamental improvement cannot be achieved unless government, industry, academia, and 
communities work together for developing solutions to keep cyberspace safe and prosperous. 
IT groups have been confronted with such problems and face serious obstacles when designing 
robust and foolproof systems. Academically computer science courses taught to train good 
programmers and application developers but lack the ability and tough subject to protect data. 
As a result, developers today are unaware of the different ways they can introduce security 
problems into their code. There is also currently a misalignment between stakeholders across 
the software development life cycle [3]: 
Misaligned Priorities: IT developers are more focused into producing innovative products for 
the business needs. Vulnerabilities arising from defective codes are seen as critical issues and 
not on-time delivery and functionalities. Quality Assurance (QA) teams are involved with 
defective software and attempt to please customers. Security groups are more tuned to working 
towards protecting and producing critical data. They are also accountable for protecting 
localized and commercial software’s and to answer to hacking of codes after they are 
implemented.  
Misaligned Process: Security audits and QA testing usually occur at the last phase of the 
development of the software and it is at this point that it is costly to fix problems when the 
company is more focused on releasing the product to the market and working on the next 
product. Therefore, teams leave the assessment plans to the tail end of the development process 
to preempt security teams from assessing the product for defects. Moreover, since security 
assessment is not part of the regular operation defects highlighted during the development are 
not likely to be addressed during testing due to time and cost constraints. Hence security 
problems highlighted late will tend to cause problems in the decision making to market and 
ensue security at the highest level. 
Misaligned Tools: Developers’ mindset is such they do not want interference to their flow of 
work and therefore do not wish to use methodologies used by security personnel since these 
methodologies entail detailed procedures and contribute little by way of direct rectification of 
defects. It does not seem appropriate for developers to dabble with security testing. They will 
tend to oversee the results of such assessment since the unessential data will distract the actual 
solution to issues.  
Software security have to be implement the best practices to enhance above-average technical 
methodologies and consider security assessment at the very beginning of the software life cycle, 
identifying and comprehending normal threat, designing for a secure lifetime, and engaging all 
software dimensions to in-depth, real time risk assessment and testing [2]. In addition, software 
security is about building secure software that means making software with a secure structure 
and ensuring all those involved in the development process are educated to consider security in 
their part of the process [2]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; firstly, we explain the basic concepts of software 
security. Secondly, present guidelines for how to describe software security cases in detail by 
considering: Risk management framework, Touchpoints, and knowledge and method guidelines 
for eliciting security requirements. Thirdly, review a software security framework (SSF) 
practical use and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of software security, and compare them 
to related work. Finally, in the conclusion of this paper enumerate strategies for more research. 
The essential result of this research is to offer a clear, logical presentation, important current 
methodologies and to underline particular description and methodologies involved. 
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2. Software Security Fundamentals 
The science of software security concerns constructing secure software. This entails 
providing the software with a structure and design that ensures it is secure. This also involves 
teaching software developers, constructors and end users the way to construct secure software 
[2]. Details are in the following discussion: 
Three pillars of software security: 
A. Risk Management Framework 
B. Software Security Touchpoints  
C. Software Security Knowledge 
A. Risk Management Framework (RMF):  
The management of risks is significant and a main key to achieving a secure framework to 
provide secures artifacts. In fact, it gives effective frame and structure to support secure 
software.  In this part to make software security we should use technical methods and security 
standards (e.g. PCI Security Standards Council), to help governments, companies, and 
developers to determine what they should do about their framework. Figure 1 represents general 
steps needed to develop a risk management framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk management framework [9] 
Details are in the following discussion: 
1. A business scenario wishes to convey an existing business issue and to provide the 
advantage and extent of the project [2]. 
2. The risks inherent in a business will provide the basis to comprehend the software risks in a 
business environment. Technical risks are a scenario that negates the design or 
implementation of a system under construction [2]. 
3. Questions such as ‘ What needs to be done in the face of the current situation’ and ‘ To 
reduce the risks what sort of resources should be planned’, should be addressed by 
creativity and prioritizing [2]. 
4. The business should dictate the direction to be taken to reduce the risks associated with the 
business in terms of finance, consolidation and comprehension [2]. 
5. To ensure that artifact quality is consistent and methodology should be put in place that can 
be consistently evaluated [2]. 
3 
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B. Software Security Touchpoints 
Software security Touchpoints are based on good software engineering and involve explicitly 
considering security throughout the software life cycle. This means knowing and understanding 
common risks, designing for security and subjecting all software artifacts to thorough, objective 
risk analyses and test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Security development life cycle [9] 
The concept of Touchpoints are describing as a bellow: 
1. Code Review: Using of Static Analysis tools such as: Fortify SCA, RATS, and ITS4 in 
order to monitoring source codes for finding regular malicious behaviour. 
2. Architectural Risk Analysis: It’s required in design stage (class hierarchy) and also in the 
characteristic architecture stage. 
3. Penetration Testing: Testing the internal structure of software in real environment by using 
some useful methods like: White-box testing, or Black-box testing in order to explicit 
knowledge of software structure. 
4. Risk Based Security Testing: Use architectural risk analysis results to drive scenario based 
testing. 
5. Abuse Cases: It’s highlight the systems behaviours under stress. Using some useful tools in 
order to simulate the situation for developer like working as a hacker. 
6. Security Requirements: In this requirement security must be comprehensively covered. 
These should encompass functional security (e.g. cryptography) and recently adopted 
scenario (to detect abuse and hacker patterns). 
7. Security Operations: Experience accumulated in studying hackers and data obtained should 
be used in software design and development. 
Figure 2 specifies one set of the best practices and represents how software practitioners can 
apply them to the various software artifacts produced during software development. That means 
software security best practices applied to various software artifacts. Although the artifacts are 
laid out according to a traditional waterfall model in this illustration, most organizations follow 
an iterative approach today, which means that best practices will be cycled through more than 
once as the software evolves [4]. 
C. Software Security Knowledge 
Software security knowledge can apply in the various stages throughout the entire software 
development life cycle (Figure 3). An effective method is to implement software security ‘best 
practices’ via the following: 
1. Prescriptive Knowledge 
a. Principles: High-level architectural principles, e.g. the principle of least privilege. 
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b. Guidelines: Mid-level guidelines e.g. make all Java objects and classes final unless 
prevented. 
c. Rules: Tactical code-level rules, e.g. avoid the use of the library function gets() in C. 
2. Diagnostic Knowledge 
a. Vulnerabilities: Descriptions of software vulnerabilities experienced and reported in 
real systems. 
b. Exploits: Descriptions how instances of vulnerabilities are used to compromise the 
security of particular systems. 
c. Attack patterns: Descriptions of common sets of exploits in a more abstract form that 
can be applied across multiple systems. 
3. Historical Knowledge 
Historical Risks: Data collected and analyzed from actual software development must 
reflect its influence on the business. This database assists in influencing similar problems in 
later software development without ‘re-inventing the wheel’ [6].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Software security unified knowledge architecture [9] 
3. Software Security Framework (SSF) 
Nowadays software developers and other IT personnel realize that an understanding of 
software security and issues is important. There are many aspects to software security. The SSF 
permits an individual to hold a discussion without going into too many details. Table 1 shows 
the SSF 12 practices, which categorized into 4 domains. 
Table 1: A software security framework [2] 
Governance Intelligence SDL Touchpoints Deployment 
Strategy and 
Metrics Attack Models 
Architecture 
Analysis Penetration Testing 
Compliance and 
Policy 
Security Features and 
Design Code Review Software Environment 
Training Standards and Requirements Security Testing 
Configuration and 
Vulnerability 
Management 
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The more details of the domains are elaborated as a below: 
1. Governance: Exercises that assist in organizing mangers and evaluating a software security 
proposal. This includes staff skills enhancement [2]. 
2. Intelligence: Exercises that help to collate corporate information used in implementing 
security initiatives all over the organization. Collation should include spontaneous security 
action and organizational threat modeling [2]. 
3. SDL Touchpoints: Initiatives aligned to assessment and assurance of specific software 
development artifacts and procedures. All software security procedures are inclusive of 
these procedures [2]. 
4. Deployment: Exercises that collaborate with previous generation security and software 
monitoring departments. Software identification, monitoring and other external issues have 
a direct influence on software security [2]. 
4. Return on Security Investment (ROSI) 
Nowadays the security issue comprises a major part of the software life cycle from network 
security, application security, and system security in order to develop secure software [6]. 
Organizations and companies still spend budget and more time to analyze and measure the 
effectiveness of those methods they are using to provide secure software. That’s why they need 
to measure the budget usage and also provide supportive strong reasons to claim budget for next 
step of the software development cycle in order to justify their cost effectiveness and cost of 
their information security issue. 
In an end-to-end software life cycle, security issue is not an investment to provide profit. To 
comply with security needs, policies, training developers and security procedures require big 
budgets. Two questions confronting management are “What is most cost effective method to 
safeguard information?” and “What system is used to assess return on security investment?”. 
Organizations and its managers need to plan and also bring a sufficient justification for cost and 
their requirement for software security methodologies to deal with software security problems. 
People who purchase security packages for their software will contemplate on how much 
benefits they will obtain on their investment (ROSI). In the past ROSI computations were 
complex due to the complexity of the method. Scientists and researchers have attempted to 
wade through several requirements to compute ROSI and eventually decided to categorize 
security management outcomes into 3 parts each part designed to provide a certain increase 
towards ROSI: 
 Effective Security 
The paramount requirement of a set of software security solutions is its effectiveness in use. 
Combining the various advantages into a compact and complete software programming would 
be the best defense mechanism against malwares. But to prove that these security effectiveness 
methods work is not easy. When faced with the dilemma as to whether an attack did not take 
place or the installed software actually blocked the invader, to prove its effectiveness. Since this 
response id negative it is indeed a difficult task for management to prove that a software 
security solution is required and worthy for investing by organization in order to achieve to the 
high level of security. 
 Risk Reduction 
The Risk reduction is another advantage that is provided by software security initiatives. In 
order that business activities should proceed uninterrupted management should install state of 
the art security systems. In the absence of effective software security system businesses could 
face downtimes and short-term monetary disadvantages generally affecting the profitability. 
 Efficiency 
Software security solutions are now looked upon as an integral part of any organization dealing 
with clients’ data to reach high level of security. It is no more an add-on or an afterthought. It is 
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Scost 
[(ALE  *  % Risk Mitigation) – Scost] 
Cost of the solution 
Cost of the solution 
ALE – mALE – Cost of the solution 
Cost of the solution 
ALE * mitigation ratio – Cost of the solution 
Monetary loss reduction – Cost of the solution 
designed into the company’s operating portfolio. The source code and architecture ensure that 
the system performance is not compromised. Efficiency is a requirement for organizations that 
are in an above average production environment such as algorithmic or transaction processing 
where performance and scalability are critical. If source code efficiency and scalability were 
analyzed, it would appear that hidden threats and the potential degradation in response time 
could affect the customer’s satisfaction. 
The amount of funding required by an organization for security is dictated by ROSI, which also 
affords cost effective options. Moreover, it provides an essential data for the managers’ decision 
making in the areas of “excessive security expenditure”, “The monetary impact on productivity, 
due to an absence of security”, “adequacy of security”, and “ is the current security portfolio 
providing the required benefits?” [19]. 
The risk of investment is evaluating by combination of cost of implementation of security and 
quantitative risk assessment, which called ROSI. It is defined as below [19]: 
 
 
     ROSI = ────────────────────────────── 
 
 
The negative financial variance can be minimized due to ALE. This is an annual negative 
financial variance that can be anticipated from a particular risk on a particular asset, it is define 
as, Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) = Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) * Single Loss 
Expectancy (SLE). Therefore, ROSI is defined as the difference of the ALE without the 
installation of the security solution. This is compared to the modified ALE (mALE) required for 
security solutions [19].  
 
 
   ROSI = ──────────────────────────── 
 
 
It is also equals to the mitigation ratio of the solution applied to the ALE: 
 
 
    ROSI = ────────────────────────────── 
 
 
It is also simplified as a below:  
 
   ROSI = ─────────────────────────── 
 
 
Table 2: Different type of result of ROSI formula 
 
If we look at Table 2 the result of the ROSI for a virus scanner one can estimate how the 
equation functions. G Data Anti virus has previously been infected. It is computed that the 
average loss due to damage in productivity loss was $ 25,000. Currently, G Data gets four of 
these viruses per year. G Data expects to catch at least three of the four viruses per year by 
implementing a $25,000 virus scanner. 
Negative Investment not justifiable  
Null No return on investment 
Positive Justifiable as compared with other solutions 
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$25,000 
[($100,000 * 75%) - $25,000] 
Risk Exposure: $25,000, 4x per year = $100,000 
Risk Mitigated: 75% 
Solution Cost: $25,000 
 
ROSI = ────────────────── = 200% 
 
 
The virus scanner seems to have paid for itself. Since we assume that the cost of the debacle is 
$25,000 and that the scanner will trap 75% of the intruders and also the actual cost of the 
scanner is $25000. In actual fact it is highly improbable that these numbers are close to actual. 
What would the scenario be if three of the four viruses cost $5000 in damages and the last one 
amounted to $85000? The average cost is still $25,000. Which one of those four viruses is going 
to get past the scanner? If it is a $5,000 one, the ROSI increases to nearly 300% - but if it is the 
expensive one, the ROSI becomes negative. 
Generally, sensible numbers for the ROSI equation is quite difficult to say the least. Currently 
there is no acceptable model to estimate the monetary risk connected with security incidents. 
Concurrently there is an absence of a program or model that can evaluate the risk reducing 
power of a security solution. Estimating the cost of solution could be grossly divergent. In some 
instances all factors are included in the computation whereas in others some items are excluded 
such as overheads, software, hardware, long-term influence on productivity. 
5. Discussion 
This research focused on assisting organizations to well-defined software security process by 
considering RMF, Touchpoints, software security knowledge, SSF, and ROSI benefits. Our 
main goal was to how integrate software security steps as a part of the software development 
and maintenance life cycles, for the purposes of assuring the security performance of the 
system. 
Based on our research, we are facing the variety of security requirements at the practical level in 
the higher level of abstraction. It is usually easy to create some high level objectives in all 
possible situations; one can even set an objective for a system to be secure in its entirety. In 
practice IT security and its objectives could be enumerated from the point of view of setting up 
an acceptable level of protection. Therefore, it is quite obvious that all aspects of computing the 
cost of protection such as usability, cost and security can rarely be inclusive.  
While researching for this paper it is to be taken into account that some aspects can be included 
in the systems while others may not be precisely differentiated from the security information 
data outside the system purview and environment. Generally, it is more difficult to spacify 
objective to a system, which already exists than to determine them in the early stage of the 
software development. In practice though, when the system is already in use one tends to have 
expectations towards it, what it can do and it does not need to do, based on its past operations. 
At that case it is hard to stay neutral and define objectives without thinking beforehand if the 
system is able to meet them or not. We also noted that one can not accurately specify the 
information security requirement specification and the practical security vulnerabilities. Security 
assurance process should result in more realistic and concrete requirements than is the case at 
the moment. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
Today, software companies are faced with the rapid changes of security issues in order to 
produce secure software. By considering security throughout the software development life 
cycle and also through education and use of best practice software project managers and 
developers can develop more secure software. Software security requires an emphasis on 
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security issue during software life cycle such as requirement gathering, risk analysis, design and 
development, penetration testing and integration (operation and maintenance), and finally 
development.  
This study is preliminary due to lack of extensive evaluation. As future work we would like to 
implement a framework to support our research and perform extensive evaluation to verify the 
usefulness of our framework. 
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